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I. INTR0D0CTI3M
The homeowner who installs an elaborate security system
and the corporate vice president who institutes a complex
budgeting procedure are each sharing a common goal: control.
The homeowner is attempting to prevent unauthorized access
to his property and to safeguard his assets. The system may
provide for various measurement levels of sensitivity and
may include a deafening alarm as instant feedback. The vice
president is seeking to provide a means for translating
corporate objectives to a planning and evaluation tool. The
feedback may not be as instantaneous but may still be as
effective. Managements attention will be quickly drawn to
excessive variances and missed profit objectives.
Each individual started at the same point, recognizing
the need for a control measure. From that point, however,
each may have planned, designed, and constructed a control
system based on entirely different theories and assumptions.
Each control system may be alike in purpose but bear little
resemblence in a comparison of system elements. In fact,
two vice presidents (or two homeowners) facing the same
control requirement may devise radically differing means of
control, with each solution providing varying levels of
effectiveness.
Is there a standard for developing control systems?
Does the nature of the control requirement dictate a partic-
ular approach? Are financial controls based on the same
underlying theories that govern behavior control? How
important are the measurement and feedback functions of
control? Are the situations of the homeowner and the corpo-
rate vice president really similar past the point of
recognizing the need for control?

A- SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE
This thesis will examine the nature of control and the
development of control systems. It will address The need
for control and the various solutions proposed by academics
and practitioners. The design of control systems for
specific management objectives will be discussed and criti-
qued. Studies that have measured control system appropri-
ateness and effectiveness will bs presented. It will
conclude with a discussion on the dssign of a control system





The term 'control 1 brings to mind many different mean-
ings. In various contexts it may imply direction, coercion,
guidance, power, or authority. lany of these words have
negative connotations, as well they should in certain situ-
ations. These are not, however, the context in which
control is being examined. Otley and Barry [Ref. 1] cite a
second meaning, that of the regulation and monitoring of
activities. This use of the word provides a glimpse of the
positive nature of the contol process. An example will
clarify this point.
A sailboat's tiller provides a means to change the
direction of the boat. The sheets to the jib sail and main
sail provide one means to increase or decrease the boat's
speed. At the start of a race tha helmsman has an objec-
tive: to make the marks on the course and to cross the
finish line first.
The selection of a sailor and a sailboat as an illustra-
tion is a deliberate attempt to oversimplify the nature of
the control process and to point out the universality of the
concept. The metaphor illustrates each fundamental aspect
of control. The objective (or goal, plan, or mission) is to
sail the boat across the finish line first. The tiller and
sail sheets are two, of many, action tools that the helmsman
has to cause the boat to move towards that objective. The
boat's relative progress throughout the race provides both
instantaneous measurement of efficiency and feedback that
dictates possible corrections required. The fundamentals of

a control system are evident: objectives, actions,
measurement, evaluation, and feedback.
This level of simplification is only appropriate whan
discussing tha most mechanical of requirements and control
systems. Numerical-control welding machines or computer-
controlled traffic lights provide ready examples. The
designs of these types of control systems are relatively
straightforward. A major goal of managers is the design and
application of systems to control and influence behavior.
An organization's effectiveness may often depend on how well
this control is exercised. It is important to remember the
applicable definition of control: monitoring and regulating.
The monitoring and regulating of human behavior requires a
high level of control system sophistication.
B. BAHAGEBENT'S DILEBBA
If employees were always cognizant of the organization's
objectives and could be relied on to always act in a manner
that best suited these objectives, there would be no need
for control measures. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Thus, one of the dilemmas facing managers is recognizing the
need for control and then developing the most appropriate
means to ensure control. Managemenc s responses have varied
from little or no control to highly structured environments
and tightly defined job descriptions and performance
standards.
How has management attempted to control the performance
of the organization's employees? This section will discuss




The control process implies that routines and resources
are determined or influenced by members of the organization.
Sociologists, and early management theorists, would first
highlight the source cf the control: power. Hickson and
McCullough [Ref. 2] define power as "the capacity to use
resources, for example wealth, status, or expert knowledge,
to affect others." They examine power from the perspectives
of organizational hierarchy and division of labor, acknowl-
edging -hat these two concepts overlap, with hierarchy also
representing a division of labor. This concept of control
appeals to the autocratic manager who may yield x.o the most
basic level of control, the ability to coerce appropriate
behavior through the use of punishment and negative
incentives.
A research group at .the University of Aston in
Birmingham, England, of which Hickson was a member,
conducted what has become known as the Aston studies, a
dedicated research effort of both organizations and their
members [Ref. 3]- As one example of hierarchical power they
contrasted the degree of centralization of formal decision
making authority. Governmental and publicly owned organiza-
tions shewed a high degree of centralization, reflecting the
pressures of public scrutiny and accountability. In ether
organizations control was achieved not by the centralizing
of decision-making power but by the establishment of tasks,
rules, and procedures. Hickson and ScCullough describe it as
a "....less visible fcrm of power, which sets the limits of
what others may do, shapes the premises by which they
decide, and then delegates authority within these
constraints." [Ref, 4] Hickson and McCullough are careful
to note that power does not flow only up and down organiza-
tions but across organizat rions as well. The degree of
10

power may favor one department over another and may vary
from one organization to another. For example, the outcome
of a production department-sales department battle may be
decided on the perceived (or real) levels of organizational
power held by each department. In fact, power also deter-
mines relationships between organizations. Pugh and Hickson
[Ref. 5] cite the external dependencies (a power limitation)
of organizations as correlating with greater centralization.
Cartwright [Ref. 6] summarizes the work of Tannenbaum
and others which has "....underlined the importance for
organizational functioning of a sufficiently high level of
social influence within the organization." Using a "control
graph", hierarchical levels of an organization are plotted
against the amount of control (power) exercised by members
at each level. The resultant curves reflect borh the
distribution of control throughout the organization and the
total amount of control exercised. A manager who seeks to
rely on power as a primary means of control reguires a thor-
ough understanding of both the control profile of the orga-
nization as well as the nuances and subtleties masked by the
graph. Hickson and McCullough use this graph to contrast
perceptions of hierarchical power in various organizations
and to point out that power is rarely a dominion of only one
level of an organization. Cartwright cites a positive
correlation between the amount of total control and
effective organizational performance.
Etzioni [Ref. 7] discussed power as a means for control
held by various organizational positions. This power is
part of the organizational control structure, a
"....distribution of means used by an organization to elicit
the performance it needs and to check whether the quantities
and qualitites of such performance are in accord with orga-
nizational specifications." [Ref. 8] Etzioni classifies
these methods of control, this power, into three categories:
11

1. coercive power: the use, or threat of physical means
2. utilitarian power: the use of material means
3. identitive pcwer: the use of symbols (prestige,
esteem, acceptance)
All three variations of power may be utilized in one
organization and tend to be alligned with structural hier-
archy, i.e. coercive power is seen most often at the lower
levels of an organization while utilitarian power, material
rewards, is seen more often at higher levels. The conse-
guences of the different methods of control are important to
highlight: "....the application of symbolic means of control
tends to convince people, that of material means tends to
build up their self-oriented interests in conforming, and
the use of physical means forces them to comply." [Ref. 9]
French and Raven [Ref- 10] offer another description of
power.. They have identified five "bases" of power, . as
viewed from the person subject to it:
1. reward powar: conformity of behavior based on the
possibility of rewards or benefits
2. coercive power: conformity of behavior based on the
possibility of punishment
3. refereat power: conformity of behavior based on indi-
vidual attraction and identification
4. expert power: conformity of behavior based on the
belief of superior knowledge or expertise
5. legitimate power: conformity of behavior due to
accepted rights of influence
French and Raven would contend that all these power
bases exist in any organization and that individuals will
comply with them based on their perspective. The implica-
tions for all levels of the organization are clear: where
are the oower bases and what levels of power do they
12

command? Highly structured, sophisticated control systems
may fall prey to the low-level, established employee who
fails to participate because of an inherent distrust of
"new-fangled" procedures. Other employees may view this
individual as possessing high amounts of referent or expert
power and then may also contribute to the failure of the
organization to move towards its objectives.
Is power sufficient to control? Hickson and McCullough
tie the issue back to that of decision-making. Remembering
that power exists at all levels of the organization, that it
exists both across the organization and between organiza-
tions, and that the balance and kinds of power are
constantly shifting, the effects of power on the decision-
making process (and the control system) are evident.
Decisions are not made in a vacuum; organizational units are
aware of other sources of power and their resulting poten-
tial for conflict. The decision-maker who ignores these
conditions runs the risk of losing his source of power. The
decision-maker who relies solely on one form of power as a
means of control may ultimately lose -hat control.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STOCTOBE
An organisational structure is the body of the enter-
prise, control is its soul. The one cannot exist
without the other. [Ref. 11]
Eilon finds a clear distinction between the structure of
an organization and its control function. The structure
identifies major tasks of groups or departments, their hier-
archical relationships, and their responsibilities. The
control function "....provides solutions to problems that
these groups or individuals are likely to encounter in the
course of performing their tasks." [Ref. 12] These distinc-
tions, though clear to Eilon, are not as clearly drawn by
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others. Some managers view the structure of an organization
as the primary means of control. An organizational chart
defines relationships, charts a chain-of-command, and serves
as a reference point for the members of the organization.
Salaman [Ref. 13] uses the concept of organizational
structure as "....the observed, patterned continuity in the
behavior and activities of organizational members over
time." The continuity is the result of this structure, i.e.
it serves as the control mechanism. The structure need not
be spelled out by means of an organization chart or a
defined policy.
Salaman highlights where Pugh and Hickson take this
point cne step further:
All organizations have to make provision for continuing
activities directed towards the achievement of given
aims. Regularities in activities such as task alloca-
tion- supervision, and coordinarion are developed. Such
regularities constitute organization's structure, and
the fact that these activities can be arranged in
various ways means that organizations can have differing
structures. [Ref. 14]
What, then, determines organizational structure and
where does the control function eater into the decision?
Are there classifications into which organizations can be
placed? Do these classifications lead to appropriate
control measures?
Parsons [Ref. 15] views organizations as a subset of the
societal systsm, a system that facas four basic challenges:
adaption, goal achievement, integration, and latency. He
further uses these problems to devalop a classification of
organizational types: economic organizations, political
organizations, integrative organizations, and pattern main-
tenance organizations. The control measures would be tied
to both the type and challenges that face the organization.
14

Etzioni also favors the use of classification of organi-
zations as a means of comparing thsir structure and control
means. Building on his previously discussed classifications
of power, Etzioni uses compliance as a key to this scheme.
From the perspective of the organizational member, compli-
ance refers to levels of obedience and the reasons for this
behavior. Again, the power system of the organization is at
the center of this classification and permits the compari-
sons of organizations with a broad range of goals and objec-
tives. "Organizations that have similar compliance
structures tend to have similar goals, and organizations
that have similar goals tend to have similar compliance
structures." [Ref. 16] Etzioni has developed three types of
organizations:
1. normative organizations: a high level of goal congru-
ence between the goals of the organization and the
goals of the member
2. utilitarian organizations: the goals of the organiza-
tion and the goals of the members are neutral
3. coercive organizations: there is a wide disparity
between the goals of the organization and the goals
of the members
Etzioni would contend that structure and control are a
shared organizational characteristic and that the organiza-
tional type and control msans complement each other. In
fact, like power, these levels of compliance and reasons for
compliance will be found throughout the organization.
First-line supervisors will more likely resort to coercive
means of compliance than would management at higher levels
of an organization. Salaman, and others, would criticize
the Parsons and Etzioni classification schemes based on
their difficulty to prove empirically and their inability to
narrow down the characteristic thax correlates, or leads to,
any given form of or ganizat rional structure.
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Salaman, Ouchi [Ref. 17], Lawrence and Lorsch [Ref. 18],
and San Miguel [Ref. 19] all cite the importance of the
contribution of Woodward in the identification of another
variable that serves as a basis far the classification of
different types of organizations. Woodward [Ref. 20] iden-
tified technology as a variable for classification and even-
tually, structure. Woodward and her research team set out
to test for correlation the abundance of management princi-
ples and business success. By sampling a vast majority of
the firms in one geographical area, the research group
studied a range of businesses that crossed almost every
example of production technology. One conclusion Woodward
reached was doubt that there exists a set of management
principles applicable for all types of production systems.
Another finding was that similar management practices were
employed by successful organizations utilizing similar tech-
niques of production. Technology (routine versus non-
routine production) was shown to be a determinant of
organizational structure and the distribution of control.
Woodward provided a step in the movement towards the contin-
gency theory of organizations: there is no ideal structure
but, in her study, only an indication of the dependency of
principles and structure on the technological processes of
the organization.
Burns and Stalker noted varying sets of management
methods in groups of industries. Their study resulted in
the classification of management practices as mechanistic or
organic. The mechanistic system is appropriate for organi-
zations operating under stable conditions while the organic
systems 'are more appropriate ".... to changing conditions,
which give rise constantly to fresh problems and unforeseen
requirements for action which caonot be broken down or
distributed automatically arising from the functional role
defined within a hierarchic structure. " [Ref. 21] The
16

control system of the mecanistic approach requires a thor-
ough understanding and delineation of the organization's
methods and members roles. Organic methods, though, do not
rely on these strict methods but, rather, exist with liitle
formal definition and are far more adaptive to change.
Lawrence and Lorsch [Ref. 22] confirmed these conclusions
and found that "....effective organizational units operating
in stable parts of the environment are more highly struc-
tured, while those in more dynamic parts of the environment
ars less formal.
"
Lawrence and Lorsch have made a significant contribution
to organizational research with their notion of contingency
theory. Concluding that "There can be no one best way to
organize a business", these authors advocate a theory that
views the organization as a system that adapts to its
external environment by altering states of differentiation
and integration among subunits. Differentiation is "....the
difference in cognitive and emotional orientation among
managers in different functional departments" [Ref. 23],
while integration is "....the quality of the state of
collaboration that exists among departments that are
required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the
environment." [Ref. 24 ] Successful organizations utilize
different structures to deal with different environments and
display a high level of integration among subunits.
Successful organizations, then, ensure that their control
systems match their structure, i.e. are responsive to the
environment in which the organization exists.
Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of the rela-
tionship of structure and control is the concept of bureauc-
racy. In their discussion of the bureaucratic model of
decision-making, McNallen, Zand, and Lewin [Ref. 25]
describe a bureaucracy as a "....large, complex, hierarchi-
cally structured organization, which has formally assigned
17

or delegated functions and responsibilities to subordinate
or component organizations. " This organizational structure
parallels the mechanistic practices of Burns and Stalker
and is based on the premise that efficiency results from the
highly specialized division of labor and responsibility. It
is obvious that this structure, to be used as the primary
means of control, requires the most detailed level of under-
standing concerning the purpose and direction of the organi-
zation. Decision-making is reduced to following
predetermined paths and procedures, while unusual circum-
stances require additional effort and deviations from the
routine. Behavior patterns for employees are delineated
through complex organizational charts and organizational
procedure manuals.
What has the nature of organizational classification and
structure to do with the means of organizational control?
Why do the concepts seem to parallel each other so closely?
Salaman provides a clue when he discusses the structural
concepts of formalization (rules) and centralization (where
decisions are made) . Both Salaman and Child cite the fact
that these variables are somewhat inversely related and both
authors suggest that each characteristic may represent
alternate methods of controlling behavior. As Child notes:
One may attempt to control behavior indirectly by
relying upon procedures and records as methods for
limiting discretion,
.
.and for monitoring activities.
Within the limits imposed by such indirect controls,
decisions can be delegated to lower levels in the hier-
archy, and to employees in specialized roles... This can
be termed the bureaucratic strategy of control. Or one
may attempt to maintain control directly by confining
decisions to fairly senior levels in the hierarchy.
This economizes on the need for elaborate systems of
procedures and paperwork. . .This can be termed the
centralizing strategy of control. [Ref. 26]
Ouchi [2ef. 27] would take exception to this view of
control being so closely linked with structure. Indeed,
18

citing Woodward»s (and others) research on the the structure
of an organization and its dependence on technology, Ouchi
would insist on a distinction between structure and control.
His idea of structure would include traditional vertical and
horizontal characteristics while the control system would
consist of two parts: a set of conditions which govern the
form of control to be used and the control system itself.
Highlighting the true nature of a control system as a
monitoring and evaluation system, Duchi contends that there
are only two phenomena to be monitored and compared against
a standard: behavior and the outputs which result from
behavior. In order to provide a neans for determining the
appropriateness of either behavior control or output
control, Ouchi has devised a matrix based on the avail-
ability of output measures and the level of knowledge of the
transformation process (resembling Woodward's concept of
technology)
.
Various combinations of these considerations can lead
managers to select either form of oontrol or a combination
of both. For example:
Since they have perfectly understood transformation
processes and good measures of output, the tin can
plant. the typewriter factory, and the automobile
assembly plant have the option of using either form of
control. Having a poorly understood transformation
process but unambiguous measures of output, the life
insurance agency, the advertising agency, and the
research center have only the option of output
control.
.
.where the transformation process is not known
and outputs are unmeasurable, only ritualized control is
possible. [Ref. 28]
Ouchi conducted a study of 78 retail companies to deter-
mine whether or not technologies and dimensions of organiza-
tional structure are related to either form of
organizational control. Some of his conclusions include:
19

1. Both vertical and horizontal differentiation lead to
increased completeness of output measure, while homo-
geneity of tasks is associated with lass complete
output measures.
2. The more non- routine and unanalyzable the task, the
less appropriate behavior control.
3. Formalization has no significant effect on output
control, suggesting that these are independent
dimensions rather than substitutes.
Ouchi does not contend that structure and control are
not related. He does see his view of control as having a
major advantage over the structural approach because "....it
easily admits the actcrs in the environment into considera-
tion." [fief. 29] The method of control must reflect the
tasks that the organization is seeking to fulfill, along
with a strong consideration for the appropriateness of the
organizational structure. Ouchi provides an articulate
challenge to managers and academics:
In the immediate sense, the problem of organization
design is to discover that balance of socialization and
measurement which most efficiently permits a particular
organization to achieve cooperation among its members.
In the longer run« the problem is to understand how, in
a society that is increasingly pluralistic and thus
goal-incongruent , in which interest groups become more
distinct and in which a sense of community seems remote,
the control of organizations can be achieved without
recourse to an unthinking bureaucratization which is at
odds with the increasing interdependence and. ambiguity
which characterize economic organizations. [Ref. 30]
20

III. A STRUCTURAL APPROACH
A. IHTRODOCTIOH
The development of control has moved hand-in-hand with
the development of organizations. As organizations have
evolved from cottage industries to multinational conglomer-
ates the requirements of organizational design and control
have also increased in complexity. control theory has
evolved as wall, building upon historical theories and
approaches. Ansari [Ref. 31] categorizes current approaches
to control as being primarily structural or behavioral, a
difference that is based on the perspective of the
researchers and designers of control systems. Structural
approaches reflect a concentration on information and commu-
nication while behavioral approaches emphasize human and
social aspects of control. (Lebas [Ref. 32] would add a
third approach, the Information Economics approach, with an
emphasis on decision-making modeling. This approach will
not be discussed here.) Structural approaches have been
favored by cybernetic and accounting researhers while the
behavioral approach reflects a sociological-psycholgical
base. Ansari, like many others, is now using an expanded
term: management control. This term emphasizes where the
control is utilized and, especially for Ansari, describes
those situations where "....the controlled variable is human
performance." [Ref. 33]
This chapter will highlight one structural approach to
management control, an approach developed by Anthony.
21

B. THE ANTKOHY APPROACH
1 . Catego ries
Anthony [Ref. 3<4] has approached the control of
organizations from a broader perspective by including the
planning process. In comparing the control of organizations
with the simple mechanistic control previously outlined, he
cites some major differences between these two levels of
control:
1. In an organization the goal planning (what the orga-
nization should be doing) is the result of the plan-
ning process and is so closely tied to the control
function that they should be approached as one
process.
2. The organizations control system seldom operates
automatically. The critical action decisions that
result from the control's neasurement and feedback
are often the result of how management perceives the
feedback and interprets the measurement. When these
involve human behavior, or judgements about human
behavior, the control system can be far from auto-
matic in recommended alternatives. For example, a
defective traffic light timing mechanism produces
effects that are clearly evident and often the tempo-
rary solution will be obvious. When dealing with
employees, the course to bring about desired behavior
may not be so easily decipherable.
3. Organizational control will often require inter-
organizational coordination. A simplistic control
system often acts autonomously with no regard for
other systems. Organizational control seldom enjoys
the luxury of such isolation.
22

4. Organizations are subject to a form of control not
inherent in the system: the employee»s self control.
Each employee can exercise some judgement, whether
called for or not, in carrying out responsibilities.
Motivation can be the result of numerous personal
reasons (i.e. religion, prejudices, education) but
the outcome is the same: behavior influenced not by
the control system but by the employee f s self
control.
-In order to encompass these varied aspects o
control, Anthony has classified planning and control activ-
ites into three categories: (1) strategic planning, (2)
management control, and (3) operational control. These





Strategic planning is the process of deciding on
the objectives of the organizatioa, on changes in these
objectives, on the resources used to attain these objec-
tives, and on the policies that ace to govern the acqui-
sition, use, and disposition of these resources.
[Hef. 35]
Strategic planning is concerned with the organiza-
tion's future, its long-raage plans and policies. The oper-
ations of the organization will be guided by this planning.
Where does the organization want to be in ten years? What
new purpcses or markets or missions does the organization
wish to pursue? The strategic plan will usually reference
parts of the organization rather than the whole entity. For
example, diversification or vertical integration may be the
key elements of a strategic plan. The plan will identify
conditions or opportunities for growth or change. Strategic
planning should not follow any timetable or regularity; its
23

strength lies in its ability to ba responsive to opportuni-
ties that arise or are presented. As a part of the organi-
zations information system, the strategic planning function
relies on information that is typically generated outside
the organization, rather than on information that is
routinely found in its day-to-day operations. This point is
made clearer when remembering the nature of the strategic
planning process. The future is clouded with estimates,
projections, forecasts, and personal expectations.
Developing a strategic plan encompasses these less-than-
factual figures and notions, and attempting to format them
into organizational goals. The unigue information
reguirement of strategic planning is evident.
The activities of strategic planning are most often
conducted by the organization's top management. Ideally,
their perspective is not obscured by the type of mid-level
myopia that often, and appropriately, confronts the oper-
ating management of an organization. That is not to say
that the strategic planner is necessarily free of bias. The
planner's professional background lay provide a reference
point that is difficult to lose sight of. For example, the
district sales manager who finds himself promoted to a
corporate level marketing management position brings along a
viewpoint that may very well clash with the comptroller who
rose through the accounting ranks. A Naval officer who has
commanded destroyers for much of his career may encounter
significant personal difficulty whea assigned to the Navy*s
long range planning group and asked to participate in
decisions concerning the Navy of the twenty-first century.
The strategic planning function, then, is an itera-
tive process that guides the future course of the organiza-
tion. Its perspective is long-range and its information
reguirement unigue. Its direction will, ideally, reflect




3 . Manaaa aent C ontrol
Management Control is the process by which
managers assure that resources are obtained and used
effectively and efficiently in ths accomplishment of the
organization's objectives. [Ref. 36]
Anthony's definition of management control not only
provides a meaning to the concept but a contrast with the
nature of strategic planning as well. It is a control
process used by managers. This process involves regularity,
an action that is continuous. Contrasted with the strategic
planning function, a function that responds to conditions
and opportunites, management control responds to the organi-
zation's goals and the implementation of the organization's
actions to achieve those goals. k control primarily exer-
cised by line managers, management control is exerted over
employees and other managers. Remember that coordination of
control is a key aspect of organizational control.
Note the mention of effectiveness and efficiency in
the definition of management control. It is at this point
that measurement becomes an important part of the control
process. Tha strategic plan of an organization may not be
measurable for years to come but management control reguires
a measurement of not only whether or not the organization's
resources are being used efficiently but whether or not they
are being used to achieve the organization's goals. For
example, a charity-sponsored meals program may be providing
free, nutritous meals throughout the community. If,
however, the recipients of the generosity are not the indi-
gent street-dwellers but rather the less-needy members of
the community, the charitable organization has scored high
in efficiency but proved ineffectivs in meeting its goal of
providing for the downtrodden.
25

Management control narrows its information require-
ment. The information is usually in the form of plans and
reports of actual data. Combine this with the emphasis on
resource utilization and it becomes evident that the infor-
mation of management control is most appropriately
expressed in financial terms and measured in monetary units.
This method of information provides management with a means
of comparison, evaluation, and performance measurement. For
a profit oriented organization this means of evaluation
provides a measure of fairness (perhaps only perceived) in
comparisons of subunits contribution to the organization's
goals.
Management control is an ongoing, managerial process
that strives to ensure that the organization is efficiently
moving towards the strategic goals of the organization. It
is a control that is measurable and open to evaluation.
*• Ope rat ional Contro l
Operational control is the process of assuring
that specific tasks are carried out effectively and
efficiently. [Ref. 37]
This form of control comes closer to the form of
mechanistic control outlined previously. The focus is on
specific, identifiable tasks and relationships where actions
and results can be analyzed and optimum results known with a
high degree of certainty. The tasks are usually identifi-
able with a factual body of science or are appropriate for
mathematical modeling. This form of control does not neces-
sarily exclude situations where the employee is an active
participant. Queuing theory, and its application to the
length of the line at a fast-food restaurant, has employees
as a central component of any solution equation. A more
appropriate example of operational control is a cash
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management algorithm used by a large mail-order firm. By an
accurate (mathematical) assessment of the firm's daily cash
requirements, available cash is mora efficiently put to use.
Operational control, then, depends upon how well
each activity can be analyzed and whether or not an optimum
relationship can be found. Measurement is not usually done
in financial terms or units.
C. DISCUSSION
These forms of planning and control do not exist in
isolation. In fact, all three are easily imagined in
typical organizations. The strategic planning function of
an organization is a key to its long-term viability.
Planning has long been noted as one of the key management
functions but in Anthony's approach it becomes so closely
alligned with the control process that it becomes a part of
the process. A control system that exists in isolation from
the planning function does so at the risk of controlling
towards the wrong output.
Euske [Bef. 38] uses Anthony's categorization to discuss
the usefulness of the budget as a management control device.
His discussion is especially appropriate for public sector




3. Operating and Accounting
4. Reporting and Analysis
This approach to the management control process is most
obvious in the Department of Defense which utilizes a




Euske points out that this concept of management control
is attractive to the private sector because of the avail-
ability of the profit measure and the use of flexible budg-
eting. These two devices provide a means for both planning
and the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness. The
public sector often lacks these Deans and so those same
forms of measurement become more difficult. In fact,
government managers are often faced with the prospect of
losing any budgeted funds not expeaded, while at the same
time their performance evaluation may be based on the amount
of funds and their expenditure. Euske discusses the impor-
tance of tying performance measures to the organization's
goal and seeking to ensure that thsse are reflected in the
budget. He concludes:
Therefore, if the budget is to be a useful management
control tool, emphasis must be placed not only on the
expenditure of funds represented by the budget but also
on the specific goals or services that are generated by
these expenditures. In other words, if effort or input
measures predominate, careful analysis is necessary to
assure that the measures do relate to desired output.
[let. 39]
Ansari suggests that the structural approach to manage-
ment control places too much emphasis on the variables of
information and communication and not enough emphasis on
social variables. As evidence he offers management
controls primary use of financial terms and measurements.
Although Ansari is building the background for his own view
of an integrated approach to control system design, his
criticism, along with Euske*s discussion, points out the
accounting perspective of this concept of management control
and its potential limited nature.
Otley and Berry are less kind in their comments on the
Anthony categorization. These authors contend that:
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1. Organizational theorists have tended to study the
effects of control rather than their appropriateness.
2. Contol theorists have ignored the human element which
renders organizations so unique from other systems.
3. Accounting researchers have ignored both bodies of
thought and require an updated base upon which to
design control systems.
Otley and Berry argue that the development of accounting
is still languishing in outmoded organization theory despite
its potential to "....serve as a control system by providing
both a language and a set of procedures for establishing
quantitative standards of perfornance and in measuring
actual performance." [Ref. 40] rhey cite the need for
accounting information to match the control procedures of
organizations. Claiming that Anthony's management control
attempts to bridge that gap, they find it lacking:
Despite its initial plausibility, this definition by
which managsment control is distmauished from strategic
planning and operational control raises significant
problems. .
.
1. The problem of defining organizational goals is
explained away by relegating it to the realm of
strategic planning.
2. The issue of ensuring that desired activities
occur is left to operational control. The
purpose of this simplification is to define an
area of study which can ignore rhe great differ-
ences in organization -chat occur due to tech-
nology and environment, so as to be able to
discover a universal system of management
control
.
Having done this leaves an emaciated concept of manage-
ment control which may have been valuable as an initial
strategy, but is a present embarrassment in implying an
over-narrow view of the management control process.
[Ref. 41]
Lebas notes one reason for the attractiveness of this
concept of management control. The approach does not empha-
size a behavior model but rather a construction of a set of
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rules and procedures whose effectiveness is measured by
financial terms. As he points out, "....managers do not
want theories; they want solutions." [Hef. **2]
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IV. THE BE g |VIORAL APPROACH
A. IHTEODOCTIOH
The behavioral approach to management control centers on
the way in which human bahavior and social processes are
directed to fulfilling the goals of the organization. The
nature and complexity of human behavior has resulted in a
diverse number of behavioral approaches to control in
organizations. This section will highlight the evolutionary
nature of the behavioral approach and the control theories
of a number of authors.
B. EVOL0TI0H
Ansari [8ef. 43] divides tha evolution of behavior
control into three phases, (1) the traditional management
phase, (2) the human relations phase, and (3) the
contingency theory phase.
1 . The traditional management phase reflects the early
views of management, priaarily the concepts of
Taylor 1 s scientific management. The essence of the
control system has already been discussed: power.
The maaagers of an organization controlled employees
behavior by their control of the rewards and the
organizations resources. Managements focus was in
determining the optimum way to carry out tasks and
then utilizing their power to obtain the employees
compliance.
2. The human relations phase is characterized by the
shift of thought from a view of employees as strictly
economically motivated to a view of employees who
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also seek psychological satisfaction. This phase
recognized that employees had other needs than
economic ones and that the organization could satisfy
some of these needs. Maslow's well known hierarchy
of needs emphasized varying levels of these indi-
vidual reguirements, from basic physiological needs
to the need for self-actualization. The effects on
managements control was a shift from trying to moti-
vate with power to motivating by increasing worker
satisfaction. Ansari calls the phase "....a change
in focus of the management function from direction to
leadership." [Ref. 44 ]
3. The essence of the contingency theory phase has been
highlighted in Chapter II. Its premise is that the
search for the one-best-way of organizing or control-
ling promises to result in disappointment. There are
too many variables, too many structures, and too many
conditions. The search should focus on the most
appropriate solution for a given state of
circumstances
.
1 • Genera l Syst ems Theory
Ansari points out that much of the contingency
theory emphasis derives from general systems theory and its
applications to organizations. This theory evolved from the
precept that there is a level at which the principles of
scientific disciplines begin, or relate to each other. The
level is the "system". Miller [ Ref . 45] defines a system as
"....a set of interacting units with relationships among
them." Each system relates to every other system, usually
analogized as a hierarchy of order. Each system exists in
an environment, an environment that consists of higher-order




Although this barely scratches the surface of
general systems theory, its adaption to organizations is
easily imagined. Organizations do not exist in isolation
from their environment and departments within organizations
do not exist in isolation from each other. System concepts
of boundaries, an open or closed nature, and entropy all
find analogies in organization theory. The attractiveness
of general systems theory to contingency theory is that it
points out the myriad involvements and interactions inherent
in organizations and their employees. The proposition that
any one theory or control system is appropriate for all
organizations quickly loses credibility. The analysis of
the organization's relationships, its technologies, its
environment, and its employees will lead to a set of
conditions that will provide a unique control requirement.
C. THE ODCHI APPROACH
Ouchi [Ref. 46] has provided a framework to guide the
design of organizational control. His framework addresses
the difficulty of achieving cooperation among persons with
varying levels of goal congruence that are all involved in
the pursuit of the organization's goals. Not only is there
difficulty in guiding their effort, but a measurement of
their cooperation is necessary to ensure an equitable reward
system. Ouchi has described three mechanisms through which
these problems can be dealt with, (1) markets, (2)
bureaucracies, and (3) clans.
1 . Mar ket s
The term "market" is used in an economic sense. In
a pure market, decision-making is reduced to a simple
utility function. Prices (or benefits) provide all the
control necessary to ensure behavior that is consistent with
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the organizations goals. Managements evaluation and
reward responsibilities are reduced to measurement of
contribution, a measurement that is also provided by the
price or benefit. Ouchi provides the example of an organi-
zation's purchasing department where competitive bids estab-
lish the price and reduce the decision-making reguirement to
selecting the lowest bid that meets specifications.
k viable market reguires a "norm of reciprocity"
among its members. This basic sooial reguirement ensures
that each member of the larket acts honestly or, if not,
that every other member of the maricet will take part in the
punishment, i.e. typically exclusion from the market.
Without this means of reciprocity the market would reguire
levels of supervision to ensure compliance and much of the
simplicity of contrcl would be lost. Unlike the social
reguirement for a market, its information reguirement is
much more demanding. Ouchi uses the example of a profit or
investment center in an organization that is attempting
control through a market mechanism:
In some large organizations, it is possible, with great
effort and a huge accounting staff, to create internal
numbers wh^-ch will serve the functions of prices. That
is. if di/ision general managers and department heads
attempt to maximize their profit by taking the best
prices available within the firm, then the firm as a
whole will benefit. [Ref . 47]
2 . Bureau crac ies
In a bureaucracy the nature of control does not rely
on a utility function but, rather, on a set of rules, guide-
lines, and supervision. A perfect market provides suffi-
cient information to make decisions but a bureaucracy
reguires comparison of behavior to a pre-established set of
rules and guidelines, in order to measure levels of
34

compliance. The term "rule" implies a restriction but in
actuality it can be a plan or, as Dachi provides, a standard
or budget. The necessity for rules and guidelines, made
necessary by the lack of any market price mechanism,
provides an indication of why bureaucracies develop signifi-
cant levels of hierarchy and finctional organizations.
Supervisors must constantly evaluate adherence to the rules
and, with each level of complexity, specialization ensues.
The increased level of supervision also adds an
additional social requirement to the bureacracy. In addi-
tion to the norm of reciprocity (i.e. a days work for a days
pay, according to Ouchi) this control mechanism requires the
members to recognize and accept the "legitimate authority"
of the supervisors. These supervisors are often the same
persons who develop the rules of the organization. These
rules fulfill the information requirement of the organiza-
tion and, depending on their level of thoroughness and meas-
urability, provide effective control and guidance to the
organization.
3. Clans
Every organization possesses an informal social
structure. In some cases this social structure may provide
a means of control. Typically, in these instances, not only
does an effective price mechanism not exist but the nature
of the individual members 1 contribution is difficult to
structure through rules and guidelines. Ouchi provides the
example of health care professionals. These professionals
are characterized not only by high levels of technological
skill but by their shared values, values that are likely to
be congruent with the organizations goals.
When these socialization processes characterize groups
such as physicians or nurses who occupy different orga-
nizations but with similar values. we refer to them as
professions. »hen the socialization process refers to
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all the citizens of a political unit, we refer to it as
a culture. When it refers to the properties of a unique
organization, we may refer to it as a clan. [Hef. 48]
These values play a key rols in the demanding social
requirement of a clan:
ii j-e4uij.es a nign level or committment on tne pc__
each individual to those socially prescribed behaviors.[Ref. U9]
*• Behavior and Output Control
These mechanisms of control are in line with Ouchi*s
nature of a control system, outlined in Chapter II. Recall
that the only two subjects of measurement, according to
Ouchi, are behavior and outputs. In a pure market mecha-
nism, output measurement is satisfied through the use of
prices. In a bureaucracy, behavior is measured through both
a comparison of adherence to rules and an evaluation by the
superior. In a clan mechanism, neither behavior nor outputs
are effective measurements and the ceremonies or rituals of
the clan may serve as the control.
....suppose that we are running a research laboratory
at a multibillion dollar corporation. we have no
ability to define the rules of behavior which, if
followed, will lead to the desired breakthroughs which
will, in turn, lead to marketable new products for the
company. We can measure the ultimate success of a
scientific discovery, but it may take ten, twenty, or
even fifty years for an apparently arcane discovery to
be fully appreciated. Certainly, we would be wary of
using a strong form of output control to encourage
certain scientists in our lab while discouraging others.
Effectively, we are unable to use either behavior or
output measures, thus leaving us with no "rational"form
of control. [Ref. 50]
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D. TBE USE OF BEHA7I0E CONTROLS
Cammann [Ref, 51] discussed the relationship between
control systems and their results (the outcomes and behav-
iors they produce) . Despite a body of research that indi-
cates budgets and other financial reports are important
tools for influencing subordinates, he laments the lack of
research into why some control systems will produce positive
results in one situation and negative results in another.
Cammann sought to identify characteristics which affect
these outcomes, centering his research on subordinate
participation in decision making, subordinate job diffi-
culty, and the various uses of control systems by superiors.
He identified four ways in which control systems are used to
influence behavior:
1. Goal setting: By using the control system to convey
the goals of the organization, the superior may
expect subordinates to work toward those goals.
2. Evaluation: By using the control system as a
performance measurement tool, the superior may expect
subordinates to strive for favorable evaluations.
3. Contingent reward allocation: By extending the eval-
uation use to include the allocation of rewards, the
control system will motivate workers to the desired
behavior.
4. Problem solving: This use of a control system high-
lights work-related problems and is not usually
personnel directed.
In his study Cammann also chose four types of responses to
control systems:




2. Job satisfaction: control systems may increase
subordinate job satisfaction and motivation.
3. Tactical responses: control systems can cause subor-
dinates to respond tactically, i.e. "gaming" the
system and questioning its ability and validity.
4. Defensive orientation: Control systems can cause
subordinates to alter the validity of the information
and performance measurement.
Cammann used a sample of managers from a moderately
large O.S. organization to test the ways in which subordi-
nates respond to their perceived uses of control. His
conclusions include:
1. Control systems can be useful tools for moti-
vating subordinates to develop their skills and
improve their performance, as long as the control
system information is used as a basis for devel-
opmental problem solving, and that this use will
be most effective when the subordinates have
relatively easy job goals and participate in
decision making.
2. The use for goal setting is valuable for moti-
vating subordinates to perform well when the
goals serve to clarify agreements which are
developed through a process of mutual influence,
but that it will simply motivate resistance if
the goals are used to impose difficult
performance standards.
> 3. The final pattern of use involves making organi-
zational rewards and penalties directly contin-
gent on control system results. .. this use of
control system information will always result in
dysfunctional responses as subordinates try to
insure that their measured results are high.
However, it can also produce the functional
result of effort when subordinates have difficult
jobs and don't participate in decision making.
[Ref. 52]
Why is this important? Once again it highlights the
significance of tailoring the control system to not only the
organization 1 s goals but to the individual's as well. A
poorly directed and communicated control system can produce
poor results in one situation and exceptional results in
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another setting. The improper use of external control
(strict, "people- proof" goals and standards, with rewards
tied to performance) may result in subordinates striving
just toward the behavior that is being measured or
attempting to manipulate the measurement. Cammann and
Nadler point out that dangers also exist for the
inappropriate use of internal motivation [Ref. 53].
Merchant [Eef. 54] was concerned that much of the
research conducted on the appropriate use of control systems
was conducted at lower levels of analysis, primarily at the
level of the individual. He sought to lift the level of the
analysis to the corporate level, again using the budget as a
focal point. The goal of the study was to "....relate char-
acteristics of budgeting to variables descriptive of both
the corporate context and individual and organizational
outcomes." [Ref. 55] Merchant elected to examine these
relationships in one industry, electronics, with nineteen
organizations participating. The idea of corporate context
refers to the organization's size, diversity, and degree of
centralization. Merchant hypothesized that :
1. Larger, more diverse, decentralized firms tend to
use an administrative control strategey that, in
terms of the budgeting system and budgeting
behavior is consistent with:
a) greater middle-and lower-management participa-
tion in budget- related activities
b) greater importance placed on achieving budget
plans
c) more formal patterns of communication, and
d) greater budgeting system sophistication
2. The motivation and attitudes of middle managers
toward budgeting are higher in firms using an
administratively-oriented budgeting system.
3. Organizational performance is higher when there
is a "fit" between the control strategy and the




These hypotheses do not neglect the control requirements
of smaller organizations but, rather, view the control
system choice as a continuum with large, diverse, highly
decentralized organizations at one and and smaller, limited
organizations at the other. The administrative control
system is contrasted with an interpersonal control strategy
that relies on a personnel orientation, direct supervision,
and oral communication. Hypothesis 3 reflects this idea of
the "fit" between control strategy and the corporate
context.
Merchants findings did indeed indicate that the
approach to budgeting varied with the corporate context, and
that the points of hypothesis 1 were supported. The motiva-
tion and attitudes of managers toward budgeting, hypothesis
2, were higher where management participation was higher and
where managers perceived that budget goals were important.
Merchant finds the correlation of hypothesis 3 to be very
important. The results suggest that the performance level
of managers is indeed higher when there is a "fit" between
the control strategy and the corporate context. The contin-
gency theory of control strategy highlights to managers the




V. CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN
A. INTRODUCTION
The requirement for the use of control systems in orga-
nizations is clear. Luthans [ Ref . 57] defines control as
"-..-the process which eliminates chaos and provides consis-
tency in an organization in order for goals to be obtained."
Ths recognitiDn of the need for controls, however, is only a
starting pcint . Effective managers must evaluate the
requirement and then design the organization's control
system. Some researchers have suggested systems ranging
from a management accounting system to an integrated control
system. This chapter will highlight a number of approaches
to the design of effective control systems.
B. WHAT IS TO BE CONTROLLED
Merchant [Ref. 58] believes that too much of the manage-
ment literature focuses on the measurement and feedback
functions of the control process. Although these functions
may prove efficient in some circumstances, they may not be
feasible in others. Performance assessment may be subjec-
tive and difficult. Although managers do have the opportu-
nity to limit some of the control problem through such
mechanisms as automation and centralization of decision-
making, most managers must rely on the individuals in the
organization to meet the organization's goals. In his
categorization. Merchant parallels the work of Ouchi in his
division of the types of control. He views control as
consisting of three categories, according to the object of




1. Specific action control requires that managers have
determined the exact behavior that is necessary for
task accomplishment. Through the limiting of indi-
vidual choices, management assures that these behav-
iors are carried out. This need not be as coercive
as it may seem. Managers can institute a well-
defined policy of accountability for employees, a
policy that may provide motivation to the employees
through a reward structure.
2. The control of results places the control emphasis
first on management to provide a thorough description
of desired results. The primary responsibility,
however, belongs to the individuals responsible for
achieving those results. Employees must be aware of
the results expected and view their rewards as tied
to results.
3. Personnel control depends upon a high level of goal
congruence between the employees and the organiza-
tion. By selecting individuals who can be expected
to act in the best interests of the organization, the
control process is simplified. This type of control
also requires effective communication of the organi-
zation's goals and the fostering of personnel
development.
Although all three types of control may be available in
any given situation, the determination of the control feasi-
bility is a key issue. Merchant, like Ouchi, has
constructed a matrix that compares "ability to measure
results" with the "knowledge of which specific actions are
desirable." In a situation where both of these variables
are low. Merchant would recommend personnel control, a situ-
ation often encountered in organizations staffed by highly
trained professionals. Another example would be:
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....where knowledge of desirable specific actions ispoor but. good results measuraments are available,
control is best accomplished by controlling results.Movie production is a good example. it is probablyimpossible to dictate what a movie director should do or
performance
of the movie and the artistic merit, if that is a
concern. In this situation, the best control system
would seem to be a results-accountability system thatdefines tc the.director the results expected, holds him
or .her responsible for achieving them, and provides some
reinforcement in the form of compensation and/or
recognition. [Ref. 59]
For Merchant, two of the key dangers in the implementa-
tion of controls are (1) the use of the wrong type of
control and, (2) inadequate consideration for the cost of
control.
C. MANAGEHENT ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS
Collins [Ref. 60] provides an assertion that an effec-
tive management control system may already exist in the form
of an organization's management accounting system. Although
this system exists for other analytical purposes it may also
provide a means through which to communicate organizational
goals. Collins uses role theory to tie these concepts
together. Defining a role as "....a set of regular and
enduring behaviors pertaining to a particular task or social
function" [Ref. 61], Collins states that "....organizational
norms specify what constitutes appropriate role behavior."
[Ref. 62] The construction of these norms (i.e. control) is
the responsibility of management. Although management
cannot expect to control individual norms, they do influence
them. Collins proposes three ways in which the management
accounting system effects organizational control:




2. Managerial accounting systems have motivational
aspects and may be used to motivate (demotivate)
human performance in organizations.
3. The managerial accounting system can be and often
is expressive of the organizational climate and
thus is helpful in organizational maintenance and
socialization processes. [ Ref . 63]
Note the consistency in the functions of control and the
use of management accounting to perform these functions.
Management uses the system to communicate the goals of the
organization. Actions (roles) are prescribed, and the
system provides a means to measure, evaluate, and reward
(feedback) . is Collins notes,
For example, a budget may be used to convey to managers
e;
example of how the manage.
prescribe behavior; is careful and close cost control
required (efficiency) or are results (effectiveness)
more important?. .. manager ial accounting systems may be,
and are being, used to convey normative role
expectations. [Ref. 64]
0. AH INFORMED CHOICE
Cammann and Nadler [Ref. 65] note the finding that orga-
nizational control systems often produce unintended conse-
quences. They contend that the problem is often in the way
in which managers use control systems. To alleviate this
difficulty the authors suggest tailoring the control
strategy to the organization and to the manager's style of
management. Control strategies are primarily of two
approaches, (1) external control and, (2) internal
motivation.
1. External control reflects a results-oriented strategy
where motivation is primarily achieved through
rewards and supervision. The strategy requires a
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form of measurement that is reliable and not subject
to tampering. The measuremsnt provides a means with
which to reward or punish employees 1 efforts-
External control may also provide motivation to
maximize results at the expense of other organiza-
tional goals. This nature of control parallels the
output control of Ouchi and the results control of
Merchant.
2. Internal motivation is characterized by efforts
resulting from a sense of accomplishment, recogni-
tion, and self-esteem. This motivation results from
the goal congruence of the smployees and the organi-
zation, a congruence that results from the employees 1
participation in the setting of goals. Measurement
of accomplishment is not strictly for reward alloca-
tion but primarily to point out problem areas for the
joint consideration of maaagemenr and employees.
Participation is the key to this control strategy.
These strategies of control closely parallel many of the
approaches already discussed. Camman and Nadler, however,
now propose that the choice of which strategy, or combina-
tions of strategy, to be used should depend upon a managers
answers to four key guestions:
1. In general, what kind of managerial style do I
have?
2. In general, what kind of climate, structure, and
reward system does my organization have?
3. How accurate and reliable are the measures of key
areas of subordinate performance?
4. Do my subordinates desire to participate and
respond well to opportunities to take responsi-




Note the emphasis on the style of the manager, the orga-
nization, and the employees. This oontingency-like approach
highlights the necessity for managers to consider all
aspects of a control system's applicability. A highly
directive manager trying to operate an open, participative,
internally motivated control strategy may soon see it fail.
A manager who views his or her managerial style as being
participative but who then relies on a strict, external
control reward strategy may quickly alienage his subordi-
nates. Cammann and Nadler suggest a systematic evaluation,
by managers, of these four questions in order to determine,
by an informed choice, the most appropriate strategy of
control.
E. AH IBTEGBATEO APPROACH
In contrasting the structural aid behavioral approach to
management control, Ansari contends:
The problem with these approaches is that they emphasize
a single perspective- one which ignores the existence of
the other... while structuralists fail to recognize the
impact of people on information structures, behavioral
writers tend to ignore the effects of information of
people. [Ref. 67]
Ansari, a systems proponent, suggests that what is
needed is an integrated approach to control system design,
an open systems concept. This approach would consider
information, people, and technology in the design of control
systems. Ansari's control system would include:
1. The controlled variable or objective: this variable
is the goal of the system, a goal that depends on the
level of control. For lower levels it may be the
accomplishment of a given task or a set of required
actions. As the control system is applied to higher
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levels of the organization this variable becomes more
difficult to define. Is profit the goal of the
system? Is the development of new technologies tha
objective?
2. The information structure: this component was the
primary concern of the structural approach. The
information structure provides the network for meas-
urement and communication. In an integrated
approach, this is one component, interacting with the
others.
3. Leadership Style: ignored by the structural approach,
an integrated approach allows the consideration of
psychological variables to the control equation.
4. Subordinate personality: in combination with the
leadership style, the subordinates personality makes
up the social side of the control system.
5. Rewards: both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards affect
subordinate performance.
Ansari emphasizes the interrelationships and overlay of
the control system components and stresses that effective
integration is necessary for control.
An effective combination of the components.. . is one in
which they are supportive of each other. In other
words, there is a good match between them. The opera-
tional definition of a good match suggested here is the
minimization of perceptual differences between managers
and subordinates. That is. a designer should choose
those system elements which lower the possibility of





The introductory metaphor of the homeowner* s security
system and the corporate vice-presidents budgeting system
may now be examined in a different Light. The nature of the
control process is the same for each individual. For each
system there is a stated goal, an action, a means of meas-
urement, evaluation, and feedback. The homeowners control
system is similar to the concepts of the closed-loop cyber-
netic approach, but that is a design consideration and not a
departure from the nature of control. The vice-presidents
budgeting system resembles Anthonys structural approach,
with its emphasis on rules, procedures, and the establish-
ment of responsibility centers. Again, however, the control
process reflects a universal concept and the budget is only
an application of this concept to the organization. The fact
that the budget is expressed in financial terms does not
alter the control process. The budget is a tool to effect
control, not the control system.
The measurement and feedback functions of control have
been shown to be a major consideration in the determination
of the type of control to be appliei. Reliable measures are
necessary for comparison and evaluation, especially when the
generation of output is the performance measure. The
control process would falter without a means to retrieve
this measurement. However, the absence of a clear measure-
ment does not preclude control. The manager who has no
output to evaluate can use surrogate measurements or




Few managers would classify themselves as structuralists
or behavioralists in their approach to control systems. Few
modern-day executives rely strictly on the forms of power to
achieve their goals. Academic approaches to control provide
broad backgrounds and reference points for understanding the
importance of control in the managerial function. They
cannot stand in isolation but must be assimilated into the
manager's set of tools which are brought to bear in guiding
and directing organizations. Managements challenge, then,
is to accurately identify the most appropriate way to
control the organization. Just as no two organizations are
exactly alike, no two control systems will be exactly alike.
There is no formula that will provide the most effective
control system for a given organization. There are,
however, effective approaches to the consideration of
alternatives. A manager should consider:
1. In what environment will the control system exist?
The environment includes not only the organizational
culture but the participants in the organization as
well.
2. What is the purpose of the control system? A control
system should be designed to foster prescribed
results, whether they be behavioral or outputs.
3. What are the constraints of a control system? A
department-level control system may be required to
conform to an existing divisional system. The cost
of a control system may be prohibitive.
4. Will the control system be used as an evaluation and
performance measurement tool? A poorly defined meas-
urement base may generate goal maximization to the




5. Will the control system be the basis for reward allo-
cation? Individuals must perceive the system and
the allocation as fair.
6. Hill the control system information accurately
reflect the required data and measurement reli-
ability? A poor information set will quickly render
the system useless.
7. How will the control system purpose be communicated
to the organization^ members? The success of the
system depends upon this key function. An accurate
portrayal and communication of the control system
purpose and mechanisms is essential to employee
support and motivation.
8. How will the control system be evaluated and updated?
There is a continuing need to ensure that the control
system matches the organization and its goals.
As long as there are organizations staffed by people
there will be a requirement to monitor and regulate actions
towards the organizations goals. Control should not be
viewed narrowly as a policing action. In addition to the
guiding nature of control it may also provide the informa-
tion for new opportunity and growth. This control is not
beyond the reach of effective managers. The organizations
goals and the goals of individual members need not be
considered at odds with each other. In fact, effective
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